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The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is
widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of
cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a
punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well
known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First,
a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders,
and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the
presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, ‘second-order’ freeriders).
We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punish-
ing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that
such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even
if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship,
repeated interaction, reputation or group selection. Instead, only a limited
number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders
from eroding the social immune system.1. Introduction
We frequently engage in voluntary joint enterprises with non-relatives, activi-
ties that are fundamental to society. The evolution of cooperative behaviours
is an important issue because without any supporting mechanism [1], natural
selection often favours those that contribute less at the expense of those that
contribute more. A minimal situation could easily cause the ruin of a commune
of cooperators, namely, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ [2]. Here, we consider
different types of punishment, such as a monetary fine [3–7] and ostracism
[8–11], for the evolution of cooperation. Punishment can reduce the expected
payoff for the opponent, and subsequently, change natural selection prefer-
ences, to encourage additional contributions to communal efforts [12]. Our
model looks at this situation, because ‘very little work has addressed questions
about the form that punishment is likely to take in reality and about the relative
efficacy of different types of punishment’ [13].
Here, we choose to focus on social exclusion, which is a common and
powerful tool to penalize deviators in human societies, and includes behaviours
such as eviction, shunning and ignoring [14–16]. For self-sustaining human
systems, indeed, the ability to distinguish among individuals and clarify who
should participate in the sharing of communal benefits is crucial and expected
(of its members) [17]. A specific example is found in the case of traffic violators
who are punished, often strictly by suspending or revoking their driver licence
for public roads. Among non-humans, shunning through partner switching is a
common mechanism for inequity aversion and cooperation enforcement
[13,18,19]. Experimental studies have shown, for instance, that chimpanzees
can use a mechanism to exclude less cooperative partners from potential collab-
orations [20], or that reef fish will terminate interaction with cleaner fish that
cheat by eating the host’s mucus rather than parasites [21].
In joint enterprises, by excluding freeriders from benefit sharing, the punish-
ers can naturally benefit, because such exclusion often decreases the number of
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the example of the division of a pie provided by some volun-
teers to a group. If a person is one of the volunteers, it may be
justifiable in terms of fairness to suggest or even force freeri-
ders to refrain from sharing in the pie. Although excluding
freeriders can be stressful, it increases the share of the pie
for the contributors, including the person who performs the
actual exclusion. If the situation calls for it, the excluded free-
rider’s share of the group benefits may separately be
redistributed among the remaining members in the group
[22,23]. Therefore, in either case, the excluded member will
obtain nothing from the joint enterprise and the exclusion
causes immediate increases in the payoff for the punisher
and also the other remaining members in the group.
This is a ‘self-serving’ form of punishment [13,18]. It is of
importance that if the cost of excluding is smaller than the real-
located benefit, social exclusion can provide immediate net
benefits even to the punisher. This can potentially motivate
the group members to contribute to the exclusion of freeriders,
however, our understanding of how cooperation unfolds
through social exclusion is still ‘uncharted territory’ [24].
Most game-theoretical works on cooperation with
punishment have focused on other forms of punishment, for
example, costly punishment that reduces the payoffs of
both the punishers and those who are punished. As is well
known, costly punishment poses fundamental puzzles with
regard to its emergence and maintenance. First of all, costly
punishment is unlikely to emerge in a sea of freeriders, in
which almost all freeriders are unaffected, and a rare punisher
would have to decrease in its payoff through punishing the
left and right [18,25–27]. Moreover, although initially preva-
lent, punishers can stabilize cooperation, while non-punishing
cooperators (so-called ‘second-order freeriders’) can undermine
full cooperation once it is established [3,13,17,24,28,29].
In terms of self-serving punishments, however, we have
only started to confront the puzzles that emerge in these scen-
arios. We ask here, what happens if social exclusion is
applied? that is, do players move towards excluding
others?, and can freeriders be eliminated? Or, will others in
the group resist? Our main contribution is to provide a
detailed comparative analysis for social exclusion and costly
punishment, two different types of punishment, from the
viewpoint of their emergence and maintenance. With the
self-serving function, social exclusion is predicted to more
easily emerge and be maintained than costly punishment.
Few theoretical works have investigated the conditions
under which cooperation can evolve by the exclusion of free-
riders. Our model requires no additional modules, such as a
genetic relationship, repeated games, reputation or group
selection. Considering these modules is imperative for under-
standing the evolution of cooperation in realistic settings. In
fact, these modules may have already been incorporated in
earlier game-theoretical models that included the exclusion
of freeriders [30–32], but we are interested in first looking
at the most minimal of situations to get at the core relative
efficacy of costly punishment versus social exclusion.2. Game-theoretical model and analysis
To describe these punishment schemes in detail, we begin
with standard public good games with a group size of
n  2 [26,33,34] in an infinitely large, well-mixed populationof players. We specifically apply a replicator system [35] for
the dynamic analysis, as based on preferentially imitating
strategies of the more successful individuals. In the game,
each player has two options. The ‘cooperator’ contributes
c. 0 to a common pool, and the ‘defector’ contributes noth-
ing. The total contribution is multiplied by a factor of r . 1
and then shared equally among all (n) group members. A
cooperator will thus pay a net cost s ¼ c (1 2 r/n) through
its own contribution. If all cooperate, the group yields the
optimal benefit c(r 2 1) for each; if all defect, the group
does nothing. To adhere to the spirit of the tragedy of the
commons, we, hereafter, assume that r, n holds, in which
case a defecting player can improve its payoff by s. 0, what-
ever the co-players do, and the defectors dominate the
cooperators. To observe the robustness for stochastic effects,
we also consider an individual-based simulation with a
pairwise comparison process [36,37]. See the electronic sup-
plementary material for these details. In what follows, we
extend the standard public good game to one of the different
types of punishment, costly punishment or social exclusion,
and investigate the evolutionary fate of populations.(a) Type A: costly punishment
We then introduce a third strategy, ‘punisher’, which contrib-
utes c, and moreover, punishes the defectors. Punishing incurs
a cost g. 0 per defector to the punisher and imposes a fine
b. 0 per punisher on the defector. We denote by x, y and z
the frequencies of the cooperator (C), defector (D) and punisher
(P), respectively. Thus, x, y, z  0 and x þ y þ z ¼ 1. Given the
expected payoffs PS for the three strategies (S ¼ C, D and P),
the replicator system is written by
_x ¼ xðPC  PÞ; _y ¼ yðPD  PÞ and _z ¼ zðPP  PÞ; ð2:1Þ
where P :¼ xPC þ yPD þ zPP describes the averagepayoff in the
entire population. Three homogeneous states (x ¼ 1, y ¼ 1 and
z ¼ 1) are equilibria. Indeed,
PC ¼ rcn ðn 1Þðxþ zÞ  s; ð2:2aÞ
PD ¼ rcn ðn 1Þðxþ zÞ  bðn 1Þz ð2:2bÞ
and
PP ¼ rcn ðn 1Þðxþ zÞ  s gðn 1Þy: ð2:2cÞ
Here, the common first term denotes the benefit that resulted
from the expected (n 2 1)(x þ z) contributors among the
(n 2 1) co-players, and b(n 2 1)z and g(n 2 1)y give the
expected fine on a defector and expected cost to a punisher,
respectively.
First, consider only the defectors and punishers (figure 1).
Thus, y þ z ¼ 1 and the replicator system reduces to
_z ¼ zð1 zÞðPP  PDÞ. Solving PP ¼ PD results in that, if the
interior equilibrium R between the two strategies exists, it is
uniquely determined by
z ¼ 1 ðn 1Þb sðn 1Þðbþ gÞ : ð2:3Þ
The point R is unstable. If the fine is much smaller:
b , s=ðn 1Þ ¼: b0; punishment has no effect on defection
dominance, or otherwise, R appears and the dynamics
turns into bistable [33,34]: R separates the state space into
basins of attraction of the different homogeneous states for
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Figure 1. Effects of punishing freeriders. (a) Between the punishers and freeriders. I: If b is smaller than a threshold value b0 ¼ s=ðn 1Þ; where
s ¼ c(1 2 r/n) describes a net cost for the single contributor, the defectors dominate. II: If b is greater than b0, punishing leads to bistable competition
between the two strategies. With increasing b or decreasing g, the minimal frequency of the punishers outcompeting the defectors decreases. However, the
excluders cannot dominate the defectors for finitely large values of b. Parameters: group size n ¼ 5, multiplication factor r ¼ 3 and contribution cost c ¼ 1. (b) In
the presence of second-order freeriders. The triangle represents the state space, D ¼ fðx; y; zÞ : x; y; z  0 and x þ y þ z ¼ 1g; where x, y and z are the
frequencies of the cooperators, defectors and punishers, respectively. The vertices, C, D and P, correspond to the three homogeneous states in which all are the cooperators
(x ¼ 1), defectors (y ¼ 1) or punishers (z ¼ 1). The edge PC consists of a continuum of equilibria. The defectors dominate the cooperators. Here, we specifically assume
b ¼ 0.5 and g ¼ 0.03, which result in an unstable equilibrium R within PD and the segmentation of PC into stable part PK0 and unstable part K0C. The interior of
triangle is separated into the basins of attraction of D and PK0. In fact, given the occasional mutation to a defector, the population’s state must leave PK0 and then enter the
neighbourhood of the unstable segment K0C, because PP . PC holds over the interior space. The population eventually converges to D.
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more the coordinate of R shifts to the defector end: the more
relaxed the initial condition required to establish a punisher
population (figure 1a). Note that a rare punisher is incapable
of invading a defector population, because the resident defec-
tors, almost all unpunished, earn 0 on average, and the rare
punisher does s gðn 1Þ , 0.
Next, consider all of the cooperators, defectors, and pun-
ishers (figure 1b). Without defectors, no punishing cost arises.
Thus, no natural selection occurs between the cooperators
and punishers, and the edge between the cooperators and
punishers (x þ z ¼ 1) consists of fixed points. A segment
consisting of these fixed points with z . b0=b is stable
against the invasion of rare defectors, and the other segment
not so [33,34]. Therefore, this stable segment appears on the
edge EC if and only if the edge ED is bistable. We denote
by K0 the boundary point, with z ¼ b0=b. There can thus be
two attractors: the vertex D and segment EK0. The smaller
g or larger b, the broader the basin of attraction for the
mixture states of the contributors. That is, the higher the pun-
ishment efficiency, the more relaxed the initial condition
required to establish a cooperative state. This may colla-
borate with evidence from recent public good experiments
[38–40], which suggest the positive effects of increasing the
punishment efficiency on average cooperation.
However, the stability of EK0 is not robust for small pertur-
bations of the population. Because PP , PC holds in the
interior space, an interior trajectory eventually converges to
the boundary, and dðz=xÞ=dt ¼ ðz=xÞðPP  PCÞ , 0: the fre-
quency ratio of the punishers to cooperators decreases over
time. Thus, if rare defectors are introduced, for example by
mutation or immigration, into a stable population of the two
types of contributors, the punishers will gradually decline for
each elimination of the defectors. Such small perturbations
push the population into an unstable regime around K0C,
where the defectors can invade the population and then takeit over. See the electronic supplementary material, figure S1
and also Hauert et al. [26] for individual-based simulations.
(b) Type B: social exclusion
We turn next to social exclusion. The third strategy is now
replaced with the excluder (E) that contributes c and also
tries to exclude defectors from sharing benefits at a cost to
itself of g . 0 per defector. The multiplied contribution is
shared equally among the remaining members in the
group. We assume that an excluder succeeds in excluding a
defector with the probability b and that the excluded defector
earns nothing. For simplicity, we conservatively assume that
the total sanctioning cost for an excluder is given by g times
the number of defectors in a group, whatever others do.
We focus on perfect exclusion with b ¼ 1: exclusion never
fails. Under this condition, however, we can analyse the
nature of social exclusion considered for cooperation.
Indeed, we formalize the expected payoffs, as follows:
PC ¼ cðr 1Þ  ð1 zÞn1 rcn ðn 1Þ
y
1 z ; ð2:4aÞ
PD ¼ ð1 zÞn1 rcn ðn 1Þ
x
1 z ð2:4bÞ
and
PE ¼ cðr 1Þ  gðn 1Þy: ð2:4cÞ
Equation (2.4c) describes that the excluder can constantly
receive the group optimum c(r 2 1) at the exclusion cost
expected as g(n 2 1)y. In equations (2.4a) and (2.4b),
ð1 zÞn1denotes the probability that we find no excluder
in the (n 2 1) co-players, and if so, (n 2 1)y/(1 2 z) and
(n 2 1)x/(1 2 z) give the expected numbers of the defectors
and cooperators, respectively, among the co-players. Hence,
the second term of equation (2.4a) specifies an expected
benefit that could have occurred without freeriding, and
equation (2.4b) describes an expected amount that a defector
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Figure 2. Effects of excluding freeriders. (a) Between the excluders and freeriders. I: If b is smaller than a threshold value z0, the defectors dominate. II: If b is
greater than z0, exclusion leads to bistable competition between the two strategies. With increasing b or decreasing g; the minimal frequency of the excluders
outcompeting the defectors decreases. III: If b and g are sufficiently high and low, the excluders dominate. The parameters are as in figure 1a. (b) In the presence
of second-order freeriders. The triangle is as in figure 1b, except that z denotes the excluder frequency and the vertex E corresponds to its homogeneous state.
Similarly, the edge EC consists of a continuum of equilibria. Here, we specifically assume b ¼ 1 and g ¼ 0:03. EC is separated into stable and unstable segments.
The coloured area in the interior of triangle is the region in which PE . PC holds. In fact, given the occasional mutation to a defector, the population’s state
must converge to the vicinity of the point K1, because the advantage of the excluders over the cooperators becomes broken when the population’s state goes up
beyond K1.
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excluder. The expected payoffs for any b are formalized in
the electronic supplementary material.
First, the dynamics between the excluders and defectors
can only exhibit bi-stability or excluder dominance for
b ¼ 1 (figure 2a). Considering that PD ¼ 0 holds for whatever
the fraction of excluders, solving PE ¼ 0 gives that, if the
interior equilibrium R exists, it is uniquely determined by
z ¼ 1 ðr 1Þcðn 1Þg : ð2:5Þ
The point R is unstable. As before, for larger values of g;
the dynamics between the two strategies have been bistable.
The smaller the value of g; the larger the basin of attraction to
the vertex E. In contrast to costly punishment, an excluder
population can evolve, irrespective of the initial condition,
for sufficiently small values of g. When decreasing g beyond
a threshold value, R exits at the vertex D, and thus, the
current dynamics of bi-stability turns into excluder domi-
nance. From substituting z ¼ 0 into equation (2.5), the
threshold value is calculated as g0 ¼ ðr 1Þc=ðn 1Þ. We
note that the dynamics exhibit defector dominance no
matter what g; if b is smaller than z0, which is from solving
ð1 bÞn1rcðn 1Þ=n . cðr 1Þ: the unexcluded rare
defector is better off than the resident excluders.
Next, consider all three strategies (figure 2b). Solving
PC ¼ PD results in
z ¼ 1 nðr 1Þ
rðn 1Þ
  1
n1¼: z0: ð2:6Þ
By the assumption r, n, we have 0 , z0 , 1. Let us denote
by K0 a point at which this line connects to the edge EC
(x þ y ¼ 1). This edge consists of fixed points, each of
which corresponds to a mixed state of the excluders and
cooperators. These fixed points on the segment EK0
ðz . z0Þ; and those on the segment K0C are unstable.Similarly, solving PE ¼ PC gives
z ¼ 1 ng
rc
  1
n2¼: z1: ð2:7Þ
We denote by K1 a point at which the line z ¼ z1 connects to
EC. These two lines are parallel, and thus, there is no generic
interior equilibrium.
Importantly, the time derivative of z/x is positive in the
interior region with z , z1. Therefore, the dynamics around
the segment K1K0 are found to be the opposite of costly pun-
ishment, if z1 . z0 (or otherwise, K1K0 has been unstable
against rare defectors). In this case, introducing rare defectors
results in that, for each elimination of the defectors, the exclu-
ders will gradually rise along K1K0, yet fall along the segment
EK1. Consequently, with such small perturbations, the popu-
lation can remain attracted to the vicinity of K1, not
converging to D. Moreover, if g , g0; the excluders dominate
the defectors, and thus, all interior trajectories converge to the
segment EK0, which appears globally stable (figure 2b). This
result remains robust for the intermediate exclusion prob-
ability (figure 3). See the electronic supplementary material,
figures S2 and S3 for individual-based simulations.3. Discussion
Our results regarding social exclusion show that it can be a
powerful incentive and appears in stark contrast to costly
punishment. What is the logic behind this outcome? First, it
is a fact that the exclusion of defectors can decrease the
number of beneficiaries, especially when it does not affect
the contributions, thereby increasing the share of the group
benefit. Therefore, in a mixed group of excluders and defec-
tors, the excluder’s net payoff can become higher than the
excluded defector’s payoff, which is nothing, especially if
the cost to exclude is sufficiently low. If social exclusion is
capable of 100 per cent rejection at a cheap cost, it can thus
emerge in a sea of defectors and dominate them. In our
stable equilibria unstable equilibria outcomes alternative outcomes
D C
E
D C
E(a) (b)
R
D C
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R Q
D
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E(d)
R
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Figure 3. Effects of intermediate social exclusion in the presence of second-order freeriders. The parameters and triangles are as in figure 1, except that b ¼ 0:5
and g ¼ 0:03 (a), 0.13 (b), 0.18 (c), or 0.28 (d ). EC is separated into stable and unstable segments. The coloured area is the interior region in which PE . PC
holds. (a) The dynamics of ED are unidirectional to E. All interior trajectories converge onto the stable segment EK0. Moreover, occasionally mutating to a defector
leads to upgrading E to a global attractor. (b–d ) An unstable equilibrium R appears on CD. The interior space is separated into the basins of attraction of D and EK0.
R is a saddle (b) or source (c,d ). In (c) especially, the interior space has a saddle point Q. Given the mutant defectors, the population’s state around EK0 will
gradually move to K1 (b,c), or to the unstable segment K0C (d ). The last case is followed by a convergence towards D.
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riding is initially prevalent by allowing high-net benefits
from the self-serving action.
Moreover, we find that an increase in the fraction of exclu-
ders produces a higher probability of an additional increase
in the excluder’s payoff. This effect can yield the well-
known Simpson’s paradox [41]: the excluders can obtain a
higher average payoff than the cooperators, despite the fact
that the cooperators always do better than the excluders for
any mixed group of the cooperators, defectors, and excluders.
Hence, in the presence of defectors, the replicator dynamics
often favour the excluders at the expense of the cooperators.
Significantly, if a player may occasionally mutate to a defec-
tor, social exclusion is more likely than costly punishment to
sustain a cooperative state in which all contribute. In our
model, a globally stable, cooperative regime can be sustained
when solving the second-order freerider problem by allowing
mutation to freeriders.
Sanctioning the second-order freeriders has also often been
considered for preventing their proliferation [3,29,34,36],
although such second-order sanction appears rare in exper-
imental settings [42]. And, allowing for our simple model, it
is obvious that in the presence of defectors and cooperators, a
second-order punisher that also punishes the cooperators is
worse off than the existing punisher, and thus, does not
affect defector dominance as in our main model. However,
given that excluding more co-players can cause an additional
increase in the share of the group benefit, it is worth exploring
whether the second-order excluder that also excludes the coop-
erators is more powerful than the excluder. Interestingly, our
preliminary individual-based investigation often finds that
second-order excluders are undermined by the excluders
and cooperators, which forms a stable coexistence (see the
electronic supplementary material, figure S4): second-order
exclusion can be redundant.
A fundamental assumption of the model is that defection
can be detected with no or little cost. This assumption
appears most applicable to local public goods and team pro-
duction settings in which the co-worker’s contribution can be
easily monitored. However, if the monitoring of co-players
for defection imposes a certain cost on the excluders, the
cooperators dominate the excluders, and the exclusion-
based full cooperation is no longer stable. A typical example
is found in a potluck party that will often rotate, so that everymember takes charge of the party by rotation. This rotation
system can promote the equal sharing of the hosting cost;
otherwise, no one would take turns playing host. Another
example is given by studies on coastal fisheries management.
In a laboratory experiment using young fishers in a fishing
community, it was found that the possibility of ostracism can
decrease overfishing in a common-pool resource setting [43].
Another field research has also observed that a profit-sharing
local fishing group, in which mutual monitoring and peer
pressure are common, works efficiently [44]. In the latter
case, shunning profitable collective actions (e.g. search of
promising spots and development of fishing techniques)
could be a credible sanction on defective behaviours. Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that the profit sharing observed
was primarily considered tomake the various collective actions
self-enforcing: that is, to avoid the tragedyof the commons [44].
We assessed by extensive numerical investigations the
robustness of our results with respect to the following var-
iants (see the electronic supplementary material, figures S5
and S6). First, we considered a different group size n [3,45],
In costly punishment, the stable segment PK0 expands with
n, yet our main results were unaffected: with small pertur-
bations, the population eventually converges to a non-
cooperative state in which all freeride. In social exclusion,
our results remain qualitatively robust with smaller and
larger sizes (n ¼ 4 and n ¼ 10), but the limit exclusion
cost g becomes more restricted as n increases. Next, we con-
sidered a situation in which a punisher or excluder can
choose the number of defectors they sanction. For simplicity,
here we assume that each of them sanctions only one [22,46],
who is selected randomly from all defectors in the group. Our
results remain unaffected, except that social exclusion
becomes incapable of emerging in a defector population, in
which the payoff of a rare excluder is only given by
rc=ðn 1Þ  c g , 0. To bring forth the possibility of an
emergence, a rare excluder is required to exclude more than
n rc=ðcþ gÞ defectors.
We have to note that the model on social exclusion
studied in this paper has a considerable limitation: only the
self-serving aspect of social exclusion is included in the
model. In our model, an excluder can directly gain an
additional benefit by excluding defectors from a game,
since the number of exploiters in the game will reduce by
the exclusion. In real life, however, the self-serving function
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There is in fact an experimental result that indicates the exist-
ence of social exclusion without a self-serving feature [47].
In the experiment, a social exclusion is shown to still work
even when there is a negative (short-term) effect on pay-
offs of excluders. It was not yet possible to overcome the
complications raised by this aspect of social exclusion.
Our results spur new questions about earlier studies on
the evolution of cooperation with punishment. A fascinating
extension is to the social structures through which individ-
uals interact. To date, a large body of work on cooperation
has looked at how costly punishment can propagate through-
out a social network [48–50]: for example, the interplay of
costly punishment and reputation can promote cooperation
[51]; strict-and-severe punishment and cooperation can
jointly evolve with continuously varying strategies [52]; and
evolution can favour anti-social punishment that targets
cooperators [53]. Our results show that social exclusion as
considered is so simple, yet extremely powerful. That is,
even intuitively applying it to previous studies can help us
much in understanding how humans and non-humans
have been incentivized to exclude freeriders. It is alsoworth exploring the idea that a mix of these different types
of punishment—for instance, monetary penalties and licence
suspension for traffic violators—could more effectively main-
tain a stable social structure of cooperation than each type in
isolation. A fine is often applied flexibly and mainly on
material terms, whereas social exclusion can also cause an
unexpected loss of standing in the community [32].
To resist the exclusion, it is likely that conditional coop-
erators capable of detecting ostracism [8] evolve. This
would then raise the comprehensive cost of exclusion to the
excluders, because of more difficulties of finding and less
opportunities of excluding freeriders. This situation can
then result in driving an arms race of the exclusion technique
and exclusion detection system. An extensive investigation
for understanding joint evolution of these systems is for
future work.
We thank Hans Heesterbeek (the Editor), Joah Madden (the Associate
Editor), two anonymous referees, Karl Sigmund, and Voltaire Cang
who helped to improve the paper. This study was enabled by finan-
cial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): TECT I-106 G11 to
Ulf Dieckmann at IIASA, and was also supported by grant RFP-12-21
from the Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology Fund.References1. Nowak MA. 2012 Evolving cooperation. J. Theor.
Biol. 299, 1–8. (doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.014)
2. Hardin G. 1968 The tragedy of the commons.
Science 162, 1243–1248. (doi:10.1126/science.162.
3859.1243)
3. Boyd R, Richerson P. 1992 Punishment allows the
evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in
sizable groups. Ethol. Sociobiol. 13, 171–195.
(doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y)
4. Fehr E, Ga¨chter S. 2002 Altruistic punishment in
humans. Nature 415, 137–140. (doi:10.1038/
415137a)
5. Masclet D, Noussair C, Tucker S, Villeval M-C.
2003 Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in
the voluntary contributions mechanism. Am. Econ.
Rev. 93, 366–380. (doi:10.1257/0002828033
21455359)
6. Sigmund K. 2007 Punish or perish? Retaliation and
collaboration among humans. Trends Ecol. Evol. 22,
593–600. (doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012)
7. Sasaki T, Bra¨nnstro¨m A˚, Dieckmann U, Sigmund K.
2012 The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small
penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proc. Natl
Acad. Sci. USA 109, 1165–1169. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1115219109)
8. Williams KD. 2001 Ostracism: the power of silence.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
9. Masclet D. 2003 Ostracism in work teams: a public
good experiment. Int. J. Manpower 24, 867–887.
(doi:10.1108/01437720310502177)
10. Cinyabuguma M, Page T, Putterman L. 2005
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a
public goods experiment. J. Public. Econ. 89,
1421–1435. (doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011)
11. Maier-Rigaud FP, Martinsson P, Staffiero G. 2010
Ostracism and the provision of a public good:experimental evidence. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 73,
387–395. (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.001)
12. Oliver P. 1980 Rewards and punishments as
selective incentives for collective action: theoretical
investigations. Am. J. Sociol. 85, 1356–1375.
(doi:10.1086/227168)
13. Raihani NJ, Thornton A, Bshary R. 2012 Punishment
and cooperation in nature. Trends Ecol. Evol. 27,
288–295. (doi:10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004)
14. Williams KD, Cheung CKT, Choi W. 2000
Cyberostracism: effects of being ignored over the
internet. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 79, 748–762.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.748)
15. Kurzban R, Leary MR. 2001 Evolutionary origins of
stigmatization: the functions of social exclusion.
Psychol. Bull. 127, 187–208. (doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.127.2.187)
16. Wiessner P. 2005 Norm enforcement among the Ju/
’hoansi Bushmen. Hum. Nat. 16, 115–145.
(doi:10.1007/s12110-005-1000-9)
17. Ostrom E. 1990 Governing the commons: the
evolution of institutions for collective action.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
18. Cant MA, Johnstone RA. 2006 Self-serving
punishment and the evolution of cooperation. Evol.
Biol. 19, 1383–1385. (doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.
2006.01151.x)
19. de Waal FBM, Suchak M. 2010 Prosocial
primates: selfish and unselfish motivations. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 365, 2711–2722. (doi:10.1098/rstb.
2010.0119)
20. Melis AP, Hare B, Tomasello M. 2006 Chimpanzees
recruit the best collaborators. Science 311,
1297–1300. (doi:10.1126/science.1123007)
21. Bshary R, Grutter AS. 2005 Punishment and partner
switching cause cooperative behaviour in a cleaningmutualism. Biol. Lett. 1, 396–399. (doi:10.1098/
rsbl.2005.0344)
22. Croson R, Fata´s E, Neugebauer T. 2006 Excludability
and contribution: a laboratory study in team
production. Working Paper, Wharton School
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.
23. Fatas E, Morales AJ, Ubeda P. 2010 Blind justice: an
experimental analysis of random punishment in
team production. J. Econ. Psychol. 31, 358–373.
(doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.005)
24. Ouwerkerk JW, Kerr NL, Gallucci M, Van Lange PAM.
2005 Avoiding the social death penalty: ostracism and
cooperation in social dilemmas. In The social outcast:
ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying (eds
KD Williams, JP Forgas, W von Hippel), pp. 321–
332. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
25. Fowler JH. 2005 Altruistic punishment and the
origin of cooperation. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 102,
7047–7049. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0500938102)
26. Hauert C, Traulsen A, Brandt H, Nowak MA,
Sigmund K. 2007 Via freedom to coercion: the
emergence of costly punishment. Science 316,
1905–1907. (doi:10.1126/science.1141588)
27. Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S. 2010 Coordinated
punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and
can proliferate when rare. Science 328, 617–620.
(doi:10.1126/science.1183665)
28. Axelrod R. 1986 An evolutionary approach to norms.
Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 80, 1095–1111. (doi:10.2307/
1960858)
29. Colman AM. 2006 The puzzle of cooperation. Nature
440, 744–745. (doi:10.1038/440744b)
30. Hirshleifer D, Rasmusen D. 1989 Cooperation in a
repeated prisoners’ dilemma with ostracism. J. Econ.
Behav. Organ. 12, 87–106. (doi:10.1016/0167-
2681(89)90078-4)
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
ProcR
SocB
280:20122498
7
 on September 12, 2017http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 31. Bowls S, Gintis H. 2004 The evolution of strong
reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous
populations. Theor. Popul. Biol. 65, 17–28. (doi:10.
1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001)
32. Panchanathan K, Boyd R. 2004 Indirect reciprocity
can stabilize cooperation without the second-order
free rider problem. Nature 432, 499–502. (doi:10.
1038/nature02978)
33. Hauert C, Haiden N, Sigmund K. 2004 The dynamics
of public goods. Discrete Continuous Dyn. Syst. Ser. B
4, 575–585. (doi:10.3934/dcdsb.2004.4.575)
34. Hauert C, Traulsen A, De Silva ne´e Brandt H, Nowak MA,
Sigmund K. 2008 Public goods with punishment and
abstaining in finite and infinite populations. Biol. Theor.
3, 114–122. (doi:10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114)
35. Hofbauer J, Sigmund K. 1998 Evolutionary games
and population dynamics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
36. Sigmund K, De Silva H, Traulsen A, Hauert C. 2010
Social learning promotes institutions for governing
the commons. Nature 466, 861–863. (doi:10.1038/
nature09203)
37. Hilbe C, Traulsen A. 2012 Emergence of responsible
sanctions without second order free riders,
antisocial punishment or spite. Sci. Rep. 2, 458.
(doi:10.1038/srep00458)
38. Nikiforakis N, Normann H-T. 2008 A comparative
static analysis of punishment in public-good
experiment. Exp. Econ. 11, 358–369. (doi:10.1007/
s10683-007-9171-3)39. Egas M, Riedl A. 2008 The economics of altruistic
punishment and the maintenance of cooperation.
Proc. R. Soc. B 275, 871–878. (doi:10.1098/rspb.
2007.1558)
40. Sutter M, Haigner S, Kocher MG. 2010 Choosing the
carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in
social dilemma situations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 77, 1540–
1566. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00608.x)
41. Chuang JS, Rivoire O, Leibler S. 2009 Simpson’s
paradox in a synthetic microbial system. Science
323, 272–275. (doi:10.1126/science.1166739)
42. Kiyonari T, Barclay P. 2008 Cooperation in social
dilemma: free riding may be thwarted by second-
order reward rather than by punishment. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 95, 826–842. (doi:10.1037/a0011381)
43. Akpalu W, Martinsson P. 2011 Ostracism and
common pool resource management: young fishers
in the laboratory. J. Afr. Econ. 21, 266–306.
(doi:10.1093/jae/ejr034)
44. Gaspart F, Seki E. 2003 Cooperation, status seeking
and competitive behaviour: theory and evidence.
J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 51, 51–77. (doi:10.1016/
S0167-2681(02)00139-7)
45. Cornforth DM, Sumpter DJT, Brown SP, Bra¨nnstro¨m
A. 2012 Synergy and group size in microbial
cooperation. Am. Nat. 180, 296–305. (doi:10.1086/
667193)
46. Cressman R, Song J-W, Zhang B-Y, Tao Y. 2012
Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the
public goods game with institutional incentives.J. Theor. Biol. 299, 144–151. (doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.
2011.07.030)
47. Riedl AM, Rohde IMT, Strobel M. 2011 Efficient
coordination in weakest-link games. CESifo Working
Paper Series No. 3685. Munich, Germany: CESifo
Group. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1980063.
48. Eshel I, Samuelson L, Shaked A. 1998 Altruists,
egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model.
J. Econ.Theor. 88, 157–179.
49. Nowak MA, Tarnita CE, Antal T. 2010 Evolutionary
dynamics in structured populations. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 365, 19–30. (doi:10.1098/rstb.
2009.0215)
50. Christakis NA, Fowler JH. 2012 Social contagion
theory: examining dynamic social networks and
human behavior. Stat. Med. (doi:10.1002/sim.5408)
51. Brandt H, Hauert C, Sigmund K. 2003 Punishment
and reputation in spatial public goods games.
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 270, 1099–1104. (doi:10.
1098/rspb.2003.2336)
52. Nakamaru M, Dieckmann U. 2009 Runaway
selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe
punishment. J. Theor. Biol. 257, 1–8. (doi:10.1016/
j.jtbi.2008.09.004)
53. Rand DG, Armao JJ, Nakamaru M, Ohtsuki H.
2010 Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-
evolution of punishment and cooperation. J. Theor.
Biol. 265, 624–632. (doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.
010)
